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Abstract. We propose a novel architecture which is able to automat-
ically anonymize faces in images while retaining the original data dis-
tribution. We ensure total anonymization of all faces in an image by
generating images exclusively on privacy-safe information. Our model is
based on a conditional generative adversarial network, generating images
considering the original pose and image background. The conditional in-
formation enables us to generate highly realistic faces with a seamless
transition between the generated face and the existing background. Fur-
thermore, we introduce a diverse dataset of human faces, including un-
conventional poses, occluded faces, and a vast variability in backgrounds.
Finally, we present experimental results reflecting the capability of our
model to anonymize images while preserving the data distribution, mak-
ing the data suitable for further training of deep learning models. As far
as we know, no other solution has been proposed that guarantees the
anonymization of faces while generating realistic images.
Keywords: Image Anonymization · Face De-identification · Generative
Adversarial Networks.
Fig. 1: DeepPrivacy Results on a diverse set of images. The left image is the
original image annotated with bounding box and keypoints, the middle image is
the input image to our GAN, and the right image is the generated image. Note
that our generator never sees any privacy-sensitive information.
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1 Introduction
Privacy-preserving data-processing is becoming more critical every year; how-
ever, no suitable solution has been found to anonymize images without degrad-
ing the image quality. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came
to effect as of 25th of May, 2018, affecting all processing of personal data across
Europe. GDPR requires regular consent from the individual for any use of their
personal data. However, if the data does not allow to identify an individual,
companies are free to use the data without consent. To effectively anonymize
images, we require a robust model to replace the original face, without destroy-
ing the existing data distribution; that is: the output should be a realistic face
fitting the given situation.
Anonymizing images, while retaining the original distribution, is a challeng-
ing task. The model is required to remove all privacy-sensitive information, gen-
erate a highly realistic face, and the transition between original and anonymized
parts has to be seamless. This requires a model that can perform complex se-
mantic reasoning to generate a new anonymized face. For practical use, we desire
the model to be able to manage a broad diversity of images, poses, backgrounds,
and different persons. Our proposed solution can successfully anonymize images
in a large variety of cases, and create realistic faces to the given conditional
information.
Our proposed model, called DeepPrivacy, is a conditional generative adver-
sarial network [3,18]. Our generator considers the existing background and a
sparse pose annotation to generate realistic anonymized faces. The generator has
a U-net architecture [23] that generates images with a resolution of 128 × 128.
The model is trained with a progressive growing training technique [12] from a
starting resolution of 8× 8 to 128× 128, which substantially improves the final
image quality and overall training time. By design, our generator never observes
the original face, ensuring removal of any privacy-sensitive information.
For practical use, we assume no demanding requirements for the object and
keypoint detection methods. Our model requires two simple annotations of the
face: (1) a bounding box annotation to identify the privacy-sensitive area, and (2)
a sparse pose estimation of the face, containing keypoints for the ears, eyes, nose,
and shoulders; in total seven keypoints. This keypoint annotation is identical to
what Mask R-CNN [6] provides.
We provide a new dataset of human faces, Flickr Diverse Faces (FDF), which
consists of 1.47M faces with a bounding box and keypoint annotation for each
face. This dataset covers a considerably large diversity of facial poses, partial oc-
clusions, complex backgrounds, and different persons. We will make this dataset
publicly available along with our source code and pre-trained networks12.
We evaluate our model by performing an extensive qualitative and quanti-
tative study of the model’s ability to retain the original data distribution. We
anonymize the validation set of the WIDER-Face dataset [27], then run face
1 Code: www.github.com/hukkelas/DeepPrivacy
2 FDF Dataset: www.github.com/hukkelas/FDF
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detection on the anonymized images to measure the impact of anonymization
on Average Precision (AP). DSFD [14] achieves 99.3% (95.9% out of 96.6%
AP), 99.3% (95.0%/95.7%), and 99.3% (89.8%/90.4%) of the original AP on the
easy, medium, and hard difficulty, respectively. On average, it achieves 99.3%
of the original AP. In contrast, traditional anonymization techniques, such as
8x8 pixelation achieves 96.7%, heavy blur 90.5%, and black-out 41.4% of the
original performance. Additionally, we present several ablation experiments that
reflect the importance of a large model size and conditional pose information to
generate high-quality faces.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
– We propose a novel generator architecture to anonymize faces, which ensures
100% removal of privacy-sensitive information in the original face. The gen-
erator can generate realistic looking faces that have a seamless transition to
the existing background for various sets of poses and contexts.
– We provide the FDF dataset, including 1.47M faces with a tight bounding
box and keypoint annotation for each face. The dataset covers a considerably
larger diversity of faces compared to previous datasets.
2 Related Work
De-Identifying Faces: Currently, there exists a limited number of research
studies on the task of removing privacy-sensitive information from an image
including a face. Typically, the approach chosen is to alter the original image
such that we remove all the privacy-sensitive information. These methods can
be applied to all images; however, there is no assurance that these methods
remove all privacy-sensitive information. Naive methods that apply simple image
distortion have been discussed numerous times in literature [1,19,5,20,4], such
as pixelation and blurring; but, they are inadequate for removing the privacy-
sensitive information [4,19,20], and they alter the data distribution substantially.
K-same family of algorithms [4,11,20] implements the k-anonymity algorithm
[25] for face images. Newton et al. prove that the k-same algorithm can remove all
privacy-sensitive information; but, the resulting images often contain ”ghosting”
artifacts due to small alignment errors [4].
Jourabloo et al. [11] look at the task of de-identification grayscale images
while preserving a large set of facial attributes. This is different from our work,
as we do not directly train our generative model to generate faces with simi-
lar attributes to the original image. In contrast, our model is able to perform
complex semantic reasoning to generate a face that is coherent with the overall
context information given to the network, yielding a highly realistic face.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [3] is a highly successful train-
ing architecture to model a natural image distribution. GANs enables us to gen-
erate new images, often indistinguishable from the real data distribution. It has a
broad diversity of application areas, from general image generation [2,12,13,30],
text-to-photo generation [31], style transfer [8,24] and much more. With the
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numerous contributions since its conception, it has gone from a beautiful theo-
retical idea to a tool we can apply for practical use cases. In our work, we show
that GANs are an efficient tool to remove privacy-sensitive information without
destroying the original image quality.
Ren et al. [22] look at the task of anonymizing video data by using GANs.
They perform anonymization by altering each pixel in the original image to
hide the identity of the individuals. In contrast to their method, we can ensure
the removal of all privacy-sensitive information, as our generative model never
observes the original face.
Progressive Growing of GANs [12] propose a novel training technique
to generate faces progressively, starting from a resolution of 4x4 and step-wise
increasing it to 1024x1024. This training technique improves the final image
quality and overall training time. Our proposed model uses the same training
technique; however, we perform several alterations to their original model to
convert it to a conditional GAN. With these alterations, we can include condi-
tional information about the context and pose of the face. Our final generator
architecture is similar to the one proposed by Isola et al. [9], but we introduce
conditional information in several stages.
Image Inpainting is a closely related task to what we are trying to solve,
and it is a widely researched area for generative models [10,15,17,29]. Several
research studies have looked at the task of face completion with a generative
adversarial network [15,29]. They mask a specific part of the face and try to
complete this part with the conditional information given. From our knowledge,
and the qualitative experiments they present in their papers, they are not able
to mask a large enough section to remove all privacy-sensitive information. As
the masked region grows, it requires a more advanced generative model that
understands complex semantic reasoning, making the task considerably harder.
Also, their experiments are based on the Celeb-A dataset [17], primarily con-
sisting of celebrities with low diversity in facial pose, making models trained on
this dataset unsuitable for real-world applications.
3 The Flickr Diverse Faces Dataset
FDF (Flickr Diverse Faces) is a new dataset of human faces, crawled from the
YFCC-100M dataset [26]. It consists of 1.47M human faces with a minimum res-
olution of 128× 128, containing facial keypoints and a bounding box annotation
for each face. The dataset has a vast diversity in terms of age, ethnicity, facial
pose, image background, and face occlusion. Randomly picked examples from the
dataset can be seen in Figure 2. The dataset is extracted from scenes related to
traffic, sports events, and outside activities. In comparison to the FFHQ [13] and
Celeb-A [17] datasets, our dataset is more diverse in facial poses and it contains
significantly more faces; however, the FFHQ dataset has a higher resolution.
The FDF dataset is a high-quality dataset with few annotation errors. The
faces are automatically labeled with state-of-the-art keypoint and bounding box
models, and we use a high confidence threshold for both the keypoint and bound-
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Fig. 2: The FDF dataset. Each image has a sparse keypoint annotation (7
keypoints) of the face and a tight bounding box annotation. We recommend the
reader to zoom in.
ing box predictions. The faces are extracted from 1.08M images in the YFCC100-
M dataset. For keypoint estimation, we use Mask R-CNN [6], with a ResNet-50
FPN backbone [16]. For bounding box annotation, we use the Single Shot Scale-
invariant Face Detector [32]. To combine the predictions, we match a keypoint
with a face bounding box if the eye and nose annotation are within the bounding
box. Each bounding box and keypoint has a single match, and we match them
with a greedy approach based on descending prediction confidence.
4 Model
Our proposed model is a conditional GAN, generating images based on the sur-
rounding of the face and sparse pose information. Figure 1 shows the conditional
information given to our network, and Appendix A has a detailed description of
the pre-processing steps. We base our model on the one proposed by Karras et al.
[12]. Their model is a non-conditional GAN, and we perform several alterations
to include conditional information.
We use seven keypoints to describe the pose of the face: left/right eye,
left/right ear, left/right shoulder, and nose. To reduce the number of parame-
ters in the network, we pre-process the pose information into a one-hot encoded
image of size K ×M ×M , where K is the number of keypoints and M is the
target resolution.
Progressive growing training technique is crucial for our model’s success. We
apply progressive growing to both the generator and discriminator to grow the
networks from a starting resolution of 8. We double the resolution each time we
expand our network until we reach the final resolution of 128 × 128. The pose
information is included for each resolution in the generator and discriminator,
making the pose information finer for each increase in resolution.
4.1 Generator Architecture
Figure 3 shows our proposed generator architecture for 128 × 128 resolution.
Our generator has a U-net [23] architecture to include background information.
The encoder and decoder have the same number of filters in each convolution,
but the decoder has an additional 1 × 1 bottleneck convolution after each skip
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Fig. 3: Generator Architecture for 128 × 128 resolution. Each convolutional
layer is followed by pixel normalization [12] and LeakyReLU(α = 0.2). After each
upsampling layer, we concatenate the upsampled output with pose information
and the corresponding skip connection.
connection. This bottleneck design reduces the number of parameters in the de-
coder significantly. To include the pose information for each resolution, we con-
catenate the output after each upsampling layer with pose information and the
corresponding skip connection. The general layer structure is identical to Karras
et al. [12], where we use pixel replication for upsampling, pixel normalization
and LeakyReLU after each convolution, and equalized learning rate instead of
careful weight initialization.
Progressive Growing: Each time we increase the resolution of the gener-
ator, we add two 3 × 3 convolutions to the start of the encoder and the end of
the decoder. We use a transition phase identical to Karras et al. [12] for both of
these new blocks, making the network stable throughout training. We note that
the network is still unstable during the transition phase, but it is significantly
better compared to training without progressive growing.
4.2 Discriminator Architecture
Our proposed discriminator architecture is identical to the one proposed by
Karras et al. [12], with a few exceptions. First, we include the background infor-
mation as conditional input to the start of the discriminator, making the input
image have six channels instead of three. Secondly, we include pose information
at each resolution of the discriminator. The pose information is concatenated
with the output of each downsampling layer, similar to the decoder in the gen-
erator. Finally, we remove the mini-batch standard deviation layer presented by
Karras et al. [12], as we find the diversity of our generated faces satisfactory.
The adjustments made to the generator doubles the number of total param-
eters in the network. To follow the design lines of Karras et al. [12], we desire
that the complexity in terms of the number of parameters to be similar for the
discriminator and generator. We evaluate two different discriminator models,
which we will name the deep discriminator and the wide discriminator. The
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deep discriminator doubles the number of convolutional layers for each resolu-
tion. To mimic the skip-connections in the generator, we wrap the convolutions
for each resolution in residual blocks. The wider discriminator keeps the same
architecture; however, we increase the number of filters in each convolutional
layer by a factor of
√
2.
5 Experiments
Fig. 4: Anonymized Images from DeepPrivacy. Every single face in the
images has been generated. We recommend the reader to zoom in.
DeepPrivacy can robustly generate anonymized faces for a vast diversity of
poses, backgrounds, and different persons. From qualitative evaluations of our
generated results on the WIDER-Face dataset [27], we find our proposed solution
to be robust to a broad diversity of images. Figure 4 shows several results of our
proposed solution on the WIDER-Face dataset. Note that the network is trained
on the FDF dataset; we do not train on any images in the WIDER-Face dataset.
We evaluate the impact of anonymization on the WIDER-Face [27] dataset.
We measure the AP of a face detection model on the anonymized dataset and
compare this to the original dataset. We report the standard metrics for the
different difficulties for WIDER-Face. Additionally, we perform several ablation
experiments on our proposed FDF dataset.
Our final model is trained for 17 days, 40M images, until we observe no
qualitative differences between consecutive training iterations. It converges to a
Fre`chect Inception Distance (FID) [7] of 1.53. Specific training details and input
pre-processing are given in Appendix A.
5.1 Effect of Anonymization for Face Detection
Table 1 shows the AP of different anonymization techniques on the WIDER-Face
validation set. In comparison to the original dataset, DeepPrivacy only degrades
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Table 1: Face Detection AP on the WIDER Face [27] validation dataset.
The face detection method used is DSFD [14], the current state-of-the-art on
WIDER-Face.
Anonymization method Easy Medium Hard
No Anonymization [14] 96.6% 95.7% 90.4%
Blacked out 24.9% 36.3% 54.8%
Pixelation (16x16) 95.3% 94.9% 90.2%
Pixelation (8x8) 91.4% 92.3% 88.9%
9x9 Gaussian Blur (σ = 3) 95.3% 92.8% 84.7%
Heavy Blur (filter size = 30% face width) 83.4% 86.3% 86.1%
DeepPrivacy (Ours) 95.9% 95.0% 89.8%
Fig. 5: Different Anonymization Methods on a face in the WIDER Face
validation set.
the AP by 0.7%, 0.7%, and 0.6% on the easy, medium, and hard difficulties,
respectively.
We compare DeepPrivacy anonymization to simpler anonymization methods;
black-out, pixelation, and blurring. Figure 5 illustrates the different anonymiza-
tion methods. DeepPrivacy generally achieves a higher AP compared to all other
methods, with the exception of 16× 16 pixelation.
Note that 16 × 16 pixelation does not affect a majority of the faces in the
dataset. For the ”hard” challenge, 0% of the faces has a resolution larger than
16 × 16. For the easy and medium challenge, 43% and 29.9% has a resolution
larger than 16 × 16. The observant reader might notice that for the ”hard”
challenge, 16× 16 pixelation should have no effect; however, the AP is degraded
in comparison to the original dataset (see Table 1). We believe that the AP
on the ”hard” challenge is degraded due to anonymizing faces in easy/medium
challenge can affect the model in cases where faces from ”hard” and easy/medium
are present in the same image.
Experiment Details: For the face detector we use the current state-of-
the-art, Dual Shot Face Detector (DSFD) [14]. The WIDER-Face dataset has
no facial keypoint annotations; therefore, we automatically detect keypoints for
each face with the same method as used for the FDF dataset. To match keypoints
with a bounding box, we use the same greedy approach as earlier. Mask R-CNN
[6] is not able to detect keypoints for all faces, especially in cases with high
occlusion, low resolution, or faces turned away from the camera. Thus, we are
only able to anonymize 43% of the faces in the validation set. Of the faces that are
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not anonymized, 22% are partially occluded, and 30% are heavily occluded. For
the remaining non-anonymized faces, 70% has a resolution smaller than 14x14.
Note that for each experiment in Table 1, we anonymize the same bounding
boxes.
5.2 Ablation Experiments
We perform several ablation experiments to evaluate the model architecture
choices. We report the Fre`chet Inception Distance [7] between the original im-
ages and the anonymized images for each experiment. We calculate FID from a
validation set of 50, 000 faces from the FDF dataset. The results are shown in
Table 2 and discussed in detail next.
Table 2: Ablation Experiments with our model. We report the Fre`chet Incep-
tion Distance (FID) on the FDF validation dataset, after showing the discrimi-
nator 30.0M images (lower is better). For results in Table 2a and Table 2b, we
use a model size of 12M parameters for both the generator and discriminator.
*Reported after 20.0M images, as the deep discriminator diverged after this.
(a) Result of using
conditional pose.
Model FID
With Pose 2.71
Without Pose 3.36
(b) Result of the deep and wide
discriminator.
Discriminator FID
Deep Discriminator* 9.327
Wide Discriminator* 3.86
(c) Result of
different model sizes.
#parameters FID
12M 2.71
46M 1.84
Effect of Pose Information: Pose of the face provided as conditional infor-
mation improves our model significantly, as seen in Table 2a. The FDF dataset
has a large variance of faces in different poses, and we find it necessary to include
sparse pose information to generate realistic faces. In contrast, when trained on
the Celeb-A dataset, our model completely ignores the given pose information.
Discriminator Architecture: Table 2b compares the quality of images
for a deep and wide discriminator. With a deeper network, the discriminator
struggles to converge, leading to poor results. We use no normalization layers
in the discriminator, causing deeper networks to suffer from exploding forward
passes and vanishing gradients. Even though, Brock et al. [2] also observe similar
results; a deeper network architecture degrades the overall image quality. Note
that we also experimented with a discriminator with no modifications to number
of parameters, but this was not able to generate realistic faces.
Model Size: We empirically observe that increasing the number of filters
in each convolution improves image quality drastically. As seen in Table 2c, we
train two models with 12M and 46M parameters. Unquestionably, increasing
the number of parameters generally improves the image quality. For both exper-
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iments, we use the same hyperparameters; the only thing changed is the number
of filters in each convolution.
6 Limitations
Fig. 6: Failure Cases of DeepPrivacy Our proposed solution can generate
unrealistic images in cases of high occlusion, difficult background information,
and irregular poses.
Our method proves its ability to generate objectively good images for a di-
versity of backgrounds and poses. However, it still struggles in several challeng-
ing scenarios. Figure 6 illustrates some of these. These issues can impact the
generated image quality, but, by design, our model ensures the removal of all
privacy-sensitive information from the face.
Faces occluded with high fidelity objects are extremely challenging when
generating a realistic face. For example, in Figure 6, several images have persons
covering their faces with hands. To generate a face in this scenario requires
complex semantic reasoning, which is still a difficult challenge for GANs.
Handling non-traditional poses can cause our model to generate corrupted
faces. We use a sparse pose estimation to describe the face pose, but there is no
limitation in our architecture to include a dense pose estimation. A denser pose
estimation would, most likely, improve the performance of our model in cases of
irregular poses. However, this would set restrictions on the pose estimator and
restrict the practical use case of our method.
7 Conclusion
We propose a conditional generative adversarial network, DeepPrivacy, to anonymize
faces in images without destroying the original data distribution. The presented
DeepPrivacy: A Generative Adversarial Network for Face Anonymization 11
results on the WIDER-Face dataset reflects our model’s capability to generate
high-quality images. Also, the diversity of images in the WIDER-Face dataset
shows the practical applicability of our model. The current state-of-the-art face
detection method can achieve 99.3% of the original average precision on the
anonymized WIDER-Face validation set. In comparison to previous solutions,
this is a significant improvement to both the generated image quality and the
certainty of anonymization. Furthermore, the presented ablation experiments on
the FDF dataset suggests that a larger model size and inclusion of sparse pose
information is necessary to generate high-quality images.
DeepPrivacy is a conceptually simple generative adversarial network, easily
extendable for further improvements. Handling irregular poses, difficult occlu-
sions, complex backgrounds, and temporal consistency in videos is still a subject
for further work. We believe our contribution will be an inspiration for further
work into ensuring privacy in visual data.
Appendix A - Training Details
We use the same hyperparameters as Karras et al. [12], except the following: We
use a batch size of 256, 256, 128, 72 and 48 for resolution 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128.
We use a learning rate of 0.00175 with the Adam optimizer. For each expansion
of the network, we have a transition and stabilization phase of 1.2M images each.
We use an exponential running average for the weights of the generator as this
improves overall image quality [28]. For the running average, we use a decay β
given by:
β = 0.5
B
104 , (1)
where B is the batch size. Our final model was trained for 17 days on two
NVIDIA V100-32GB GPUs.
Image Pre-Processing
Figure 7 shows the input pre-processing pipeline. For each detected face with
a bounding box and keypoint detection, we find the smallest possible square
bounding box which surrounds the face bounding box. Then, we resize the ex-
panded bounding box to the target size (128×128). We replace the pixels within
the face bounding box with a constant pixel value of 128. Finally, we shift the
pixel values to the range [−1, 1].
Tensor Core Modifications
To utilize tensor cores in NVIDIA’s new Volta architecture, we do several mod-
ifications to our network, following the requirements of tensor cores. First, we
ensure that each convolutional block use number of filters that are divisible by
8. Secondly, we make certain that the batch size for each GPU is divisible by
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Fig. 7: Input Pipeline: Each detected face is cropped to a quadratic image,
then we replace the privacy-sensitive information with a constant value, and
feed it to the generator. The keypoints are represented as a one-hot encoded
image.
8. Further, we use automatic mixed precision for pytorch [21] to significantly
improve our training time. We see an improvement of 220% in terms of training
speed with mixed precision training.
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